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Abstract
How are the options to buy and sell a business relevant for entrepreneurs? Prospective
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entrepreneurial assets transfer consistent with empirical evidence and centered around a
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Prospective entrepreneurs can acquire a firm by either a new creation or the purchase of an
existing business. However, empirical evidence shows a clear performance divide between
recently created and purchased firms, giving this choice some significance. For instance, in
the pool of entrepreneurs who recently acquired a business, those who purchased an existing
business face half the failure rate of those who founded a new one.1 Moreover, despite ac-
counting for about 20% of the mass of recently acquired firms, purchased firms contribute to
about 60% of the employment and the total sales. In fact, this disparity between founded and
purchased firms extends over to the main components of heterogeneity the entrepreneurial
literature generally considers, namely risk, financial conditions, and productivity. We relate
this difference to the maturity of a firm: early-stage firms will face more stringent credit,
productivity, and risk conditions as compared to mature firms.2
The importance of the maturity of a firm can be explained by the fact that entrepreneurial
assets are not limited to tangible physical capital. According to Bhandari and McGrattan
(2018), around 60% of business assets are in the form of intangible assets –customer base,
client lists, brand value, organization, etc.– most of which, as opposed to tangible assets,
cannot be bought directly and take time to accumulate. The option to purchase an existing
business is a key factor in shortening that time and preserving the value of intangible assets
in the economy. Given this, the question of transferring entrepreneurial assets appears partic-
ularly consequential. On the one hand, the exiting entrepreneur has to decide either to sell or
liquidate her assets, conditioning whether the accumulated maturity of her firm will persist
or not. On the other hand, the entering entrepreneur will find it desirable to purchase an
existing mature business but will be subject to borrowing constraints. In this paper, we build
a theory of entrepreneurial assets transfer consistent with empirical evidence and introduce
a businesses for sale market that values the maturity of entrepreneurial firms.
The agenda of assessing and explaining the purchase and the sale of entrepreneurial as-
sets presents a few challenges. Data on small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) transfers
is scarce. Moreover, there is no theoretical framework in the literature to properly consider
transfers in a standard entrepreneurial setting. Thus this paper makes two main contribu-
tions. First, we provide a theoretical framework with endogenous options to buy or found
businesses on the entry side and sell and liquidate them on the exit side. Our model embeds
a businesses for sale market allowing firm transfers and is designed to capture the frictions
appearing on that market. We especially consider two distinct margins that interact with the
decision to either purchase or found a business on the SME market: (i) the existence of sub-
1Whenever possible, we define an entrepreneur as an individual actively managing a firm, deriving her pri-
mary source of income from it, and holding at least a part of the business assets. We, therefore, exclude passive
business owners from the analysis.
2Indeed, those margins have been shown to be age-dependent. See, among others, Dunne et al. (1988), Sakai
et al. (2010), or Dyrda (2015).
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stantial differences between the foundation of a new business and a purchase that we capture
with the concept of maturity, (ii) selling and purchasing frictions that limit business transfers
in equilibrium. Second, we study the quantitative importance of those margins on aggregate
and distributional outcomes.
Our baseline economy is a stylized life-cycle occupational choice model with hetero-
geneous agents. Individuals choose whether to work in a corporate sector or to be en-
trepreneurs. We introduce key endogenous choices: each period, an incumbent entrepreneur
might need to sell her business and will face an equilibrium selling price as well as a proba-
bility to sell. Without an opportunity to sell, the incumbent will be forced to either continue
her current activity or liquidate the business assets. Conversely, a prospective entrepreneur
might enter the sector by endogenously choosing a firm size and either finding an existing
business to buy or founding a new one, these decisions being subject to credit constraints and
specific costs. A small and medium-sized enterprises for sale market (SMESM) aggregates
selling and buying decisions. Its equilibrium price is designed as an abstract object to ac-
count for both the intertemporal and intangible value of a business. Outside this market, the
value of intangible assets cannot be recovered. With the concept of maturity, we introduce a
very parsimonious measure of intangible assets: for two firms with the same level of tangible
assets, the difference in the sale value will reflect specific advantages provided by transferable
intangible assets. As most intangibles cannot be directly bought and their accumulation is
time-intensive, we argue that the maturity of a firm is a measurement of the intangibles it has
built. We assume that all founded businesses are early-stage immature firms with low levels
of intangibles whereas purchased ones are well-established and mature with high levels of
intangibles. This assumption is supported by empirical evidence: controlling for character-
istics of firms and owners, early-stage businesses are, on average, more likely to fail, make
lower profits, are charged higher interest rates and have a tighter borrowing constraint.
We support our theoretical contribution with data from the Survey of Small Business Fi-
nances (SSBF), the Survey of Business Owners (SBO), and the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF). With the above data, we first show that business buying and selling constitutes funda-
mental margins for entrepreneurs. Second, we document notable differences between busi-
ness acquisition as a result of a purchase as opposed to a new creation and illustrate that,
overall, the transfer of business assets over the SMESM results in more efficient acquisition
patterns. We use key moments in the SCF, the SBO, and the SSBF data to discipline our
model and show that our baseline setting provides a consistent aggregate and cross-sectional
representation of the U.S. economy. We carefully validate the properties of our baseline, even
outside of specific targets. For instance, the model plausibly accounts for entrepreneurial life-
cycle patterns, the increasing survival rate relative to the preceding year as businesses age,
and it furthermore generates a consistent concentration at the top of the wealth distribution.
Our results can be organized around four main points, all related to the significance of
the SMESM and the maturity of firms. First, we demonstrate the aggregate importance of
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the SMESM by shutting down that market: under our standard parameterization, the aggre-
gate output drops by a substantial 10.5% with respect to our baseline. This drop is mostly
due to an important decrease in the SME sector production. Aggregate savings also decline
but at the general equilibrium, the interest rate increases and the wage rate falls, somewhat
counteracting potential further output losses. At the same time, the fraction of entrepreneurs
decreases despite being mitigated by higher incentives to enter entrepreneurship due to the
combined effect of prices. However, the fraction of mature businesses clearly diminishes,
changing the composition of the types of firms in the economy: trading on the SMESM gen-
erates larger businesses and the ability to transfer maturity preserves the higher survival
rates, profitability, and better credit conditions of existing firms.
Second, we decompose the maturity of a firm into its components –namely failure rates,
profit rates, and borrowing limit and interest rates– in order to understand the specific impact
of each of them on aggregate outcomes. We find that the lower failure rate and higher
profit rate of mature businesses are the most important elements embedded in the option
value of purchasing a business relative to founding while the other components only have
marginal effects. Without the contribution of the first two components, the fraction of business
purchasers substantially reduces. Moreover, when the contribution of all components of
maturity is removed, we show that there is nothing of value to transfer on the SMESM.
Third, we underline a completely new channel to match wealth concentration and inequal-
ity based on the heterogeneity of firms and which is furthermore consistent with empirical
evidence. Our baseline model convincingly reproduces the U.S. wealth concentration but the
novel aspect is due to the key role of the SMESM and maturity in producing that outcome. In-
deed, mature firms accumulate higher returns and, because of lower failure rates, they do so
over longer periods. In turn, the SMESM preserves the benefits of maturity between owners,
concentrating more wealth into the hands of these individuals.
Finally, we find that matching frictions on the SMESM have a substantial impact on ag-
gregate outcome and the wealth distribution. Increasing the probability to sell a business
on the SMESM by one percentage point above our baseline increases the output in the en-
trepreneurial sector by 6.9% and the wealth Gini by 0.8%.
Related Literature This paper is related to the extensive literature on SMEs and entrepreneur-
ship with a macroeconomic perspective. This literature generally depicts entrepreneurs as
agents adjusting physical capital and hiring employees subject to idiosyncratic business shocks,
entrepreneurial abilities, financial frictions, or unexpected capital destruction. Seminal papers
in this literature are Quadrini (2000), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), or Buera and Shin (2013):
those especially focus on credit constraints and the role of entrepreneurship in shaping the
wealth distribution. Along the lines of our paper, Liang et al. (2018) and Engbom (2019) also
discuss the relation between age and the decision to enter entrepreneurship. Compared to
the above literature, this paper introduces an empirically relevant theoretical framework that
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accounts for the life-cycle properties of entrepreneurship and the underlying mechanisms
of entry and exit while modeling explicitly the market frictions arising upon the transfer of
business assets.
Many recent papers highlight the key role of the age of a firm. The argument follows
Jovanovic (1982) and Arkolakis et al. (2018): firms acquire knowledge about their environ-
ment and learn about the demand addressed to them as they age, which is translated by
a higher maturity and a larger stock of intangible assets. For example, among many other
studies, Dunne et al. (1988) show that the exit hazard rate decreases with age. In Clementi
and Palazzo (2016), this is the case because, on average, entrants are less productive than
incumbents. Relatedly, Warusawitharana (2018) shows that profitability evolves with the age
of a firm. Moreover, using panel data, Sakai et al. (2010) show that younger small businesses
face higher borrowing costs since firms tend to accumulate reputation as they age. Dyrda
(2015) and Garcia-Macia (2017) show that borrowing constraints faced by entrepreneurs are
age-dependent and help to shape the heterogeneous business cycle responses of firms. The
older the firm, the less stringent the constraint. The relation between the age of a firm and
business performance is modeled, for instance, by Garcia-Macia (2017) and Bhandari and Mc-
Grattan (2018) through the accumulation of intangible assets. Compared to the above papers,
we explicitly introduce and model the transfer of illiquid business assets. In our case, liqui-
dating a firm lets entrepreneurs recover part of the tangible business assets while selling a (or
part of a) business reproduces the transfer of both tangible and intangible assets. Finally, the
literature has mainly focused on business transfers through inheritance or gifts, as in Cagetti
and De Nardi (2009). This paper, however, shows that business transfers through a purchase
are more common, accounting for over 70% of total business transfers.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents empirical
elements on business acquisition and transfers, the business for sale market, and the en-
trepreneurial life-cycle. In Section 3, we present our baseline model and Section 4 describes
how we take the model to the data. We evaluate our model in Section 5 and in Section 6, we
show the importance of the business for sale market. Section 7 concludes.
2 Business Transfers and the SME for Sale Market
This section details empirical evidence on business transfers and the relative performance
of purchased versus founded businesses. We mainly gather disparate information from the
2007 Survey of Business Owners (SBO), the 2016 Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs (ASE), and
the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). We complement the above with evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLYS79) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). These datasets provide broad
pictures of firm characteristics by acquisition type, and characteristics of purchasers with
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respect to founders.3
2.1 Business Acquisition and Exit
The literature on entrepreneurship has long been interested in the behavior of incumbent en-
trepreneurs but has been somewhat silent on how businesses come to be in the first place.4
Throughout this paper, we argue that purchasing and selling a business are important com-
ponents of entrepreneurship, as evidenced by the behavior of a non-negligible fraction of en-
trepreneurs in the data. Survey questions often define as acquisition the way the entrepreneur
became the owner of the business: founding a new business or purchasing an existing one
are two common alternative types of acquisition. Using the SBO (2007) survey data, Table 1
provides estimates of the types of acquisition. One key information appears: about 20% of all
entries into entrepreneurship are the result of the purchase of an existing business.5 We find
very similar numbers using the SCF (2016), the ASE (2016), or the SSBF (2003). They account
for about 70% of all business transfers, dwarfing gifts and inheritances (see Appendix A.1 for
details). Moreover, purchased firms account for a large fraction of the employment and total
sales, especially in the pool of recently acquired firms.
Table. 1. Business acquisition by type a
Group Acquisition Type b Metric
(%) Firms (%) Employment (%) Total sales
Of all firms
Purchased 19.6 39.6 42.7
Founded 80.3 60.4 57.3
Of firms within 3 years
of acquisition
Purchased 20.5 60.6 61.4
Founded 79.5 39.4 38.6
a Survey of Business Owners (2007). An entrepreneur is defined as an individual declaring that her business
constitutes her primary source of income with an active management role, whenever possible.
b These numbers exclude inheritance and gifts as they account for a minor fraction of reported transmissions.
These results hold even when only the main/first owner is considered and for the pool of firms with employees.
Concerning the exit out of entrepreneurship, there is little detailed evidence in the litera-
ture despite an important body of papers focusing on this subject and its relation to life-cycle
aspects. We find that a non-negligible fraction of active business owners sell their firms upon
exit: 8% according to the SBO (2007) (varying from 7% for the main owner to 18% for the
3For consistency reasons among the datasets and the model specification, we define an entrepreneur as an
active self-employed business owner whenever possible and as a self-employed business owner otherwise. In the
SBO, we additionally consider only individuals declaring that their businesses constitute their primary source of
income. As ASE microdata are not publicly available, we report macro estimates for all business owners with at
least one paid-employee.
4An adjacent literature has focused on firm dynamics (for example, Clementi and Palazzo (2016) for recent
papers). That literature often abstracts from the firm’s acquisition.
5Interestingly, purchasers are not more likely than founders to have a previous self-employment experience in
the SBO (2007) and the SSBF (2003) (see Appendix A.2 for details).
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third and fourth owners and to 16.9% for entrepreneurs with paid employees) and 17% in
the 2016 ASE (owners with paid employees). In the NLSY79 (2002-2016), pooling individu-
als with past ownership, 20% sold their businesses, 70% shut them down and the remaining
were in an undefined alternative situation.6 This selling behavior is largely related to the
entrepreneurial age profile and the decision to retire. Using SBO data, we first show in panel
(a) of Figure 1 that the age distribution of sellers is further to the right with respect to the
overall population of entrepreneurs: 38% of sellers are over 54 years old (in contrast, buyers
are relatively young, with a mean age of 44 in the SCF (2007) and 44.5 in the SSBF (2003)). In
panel (b) of Figure 1, we corroborate this evidence using PSID data. We find that the sale of
business assets peaks at two age brackets: the 45-50 and the 60-65, close to the typical U.S.
average retirement age. It is worth noting that this supports the fact that retirement is one of
the main reasons to cease a business. In the ASE, 19% of businesses ceasing were explained
by owners retiring.7
Figure 1. Entrepreneurial life cycle, acquisition and business selling
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Source: SBO 2007 and PSID averaged over the waves from 1990 to 2015 (adjusted for inflation using the CPI
index). The mean age of the distribution is 53.6 and the median is 54.
Finally, we find evidence suggesting substantial difficulties for transferring businesses on
the small and medium-sized enterprises for sale market (SMESM). According to the 2016
ASE, among business owners with paid employees reporting how they planned to exit en-
trepreneurship, 50% were thinking of selling their businesses to a third-party and 10% to a
6Note that the NLSY79 included this question only after 2002. One explanation of the gap is that the SBO
provides many different options to choose from for the main reason to cease. In contrast, the NLSY79 only offers
three options: selling the business, shutting it down or other. For instance, it might be possible that retiring owners in
the SBO reported retirement as the reason to cease even if the means of exit was selling of the business. Moreover,
the SBO treats businesses and business owners differently. Therefore, it is possible that owners exit by selling
their shares, while the associated businesses keep on operating. Finally, Appendix A.3 provides further evidence
on the exit rate, especially by type of exit.
7We also find that around 20% of sellers declare selling for retirement purposes in detailed businesses trans-
action data. See Appendix A.4 for details.
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family member. This is in stark contrast to the much lower number of businesses actually
being sold that we report above. Moreover, among business owners with a firm of 16 years
of age and more, i.e. businesses much less likely to close due to economic reasons, the main
exit strategy is consistently the sale of the entire business (53%). However, even in this pop-
ulation, only 26% declared effectively selling their business ex post while 43% declared just
retiring and 14% declared failing due to business conditions. Moreover, according to busi-
ness transactions data from 2018 to 2019, selling a business is a long process: only 30% of
businesses for sale are sold within a year and a non-negligible fraction remain unsold.8 This
might reflect the importance of transaction delays (training, screening, etc.) and the existence
of asymmetric information on business performance.
This paper provides two plausible explanations that could generate this low observed
selling rate. First, selling a business requires the matching of the specific interests and skills of
a potential buyer. We refer to this as selling friction. Second, purchasing a business requires a
payment for its physical capital assets but also for the value of its intangible assets. Borrowing
constraints could substantially limit the capacity of potential buyers to purchase existing
businesses beyond their traditional effects described in the literature, for instance in Quadrini
(1999, 2000) among others.
2.2 Sources of Heterogeneity and Maturity of a Business
We documented above that an important fraction of entrepreneurial firms were purchased
by their current owner. There might be a number of reasons as to why a prospective en-
trepreneur will favor the purchase of a firm with respect to creating a new one. Nevertheless,
the evidence we collected points to at least one significant reason explaining the purchase be-
havior: purchased and founded firms differ with respect to the main sources of heterogeneity
that the entrepreneurial literature generally considers, namely, heterogeneity in risk, credit
conditions, and profitability.
We start this discussion with Figure 2 that displays the failure rate of firms in the 2007
SBO by the number of years after the acquisition. The failure rate can be seen as a measure
of the risk the firm is facing.9 We observe a stark performance divide between founded and
purchased firms benefiting the latter: for instance, one year after the acquisition, the failure
rate of newly founded businesses is twice that of purchased ones. As the number of years after
acquisition increases, the failure rate decreases and the difference between purchased and
founded businesses dissipates. Interestingly, there is still a decreasing shape with respect to
age for recently purchased firms, which might be linked to non-transferable intangible assets
8See Appendix A.4 for details on this business transactions data.
9The literature sometimes uses the term exit hazard rate to cover most of what we call failure rate. As in Dunne
et al. (1988), we define the failure rate as the ratio of firms exiting due to economic reasons between period t and
t + 1 and the number of operating firms in time t. Results are robust to the use of all exiting reasons.
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such as an entrepreneur’s talent and knowledge about its environment.10 In more general
terms, without any controls, we find that purchased businesses systematically perform better
with respect to all sources of firm heterogeneity that we consider.
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Source: author’s computation using the 2007 SBO. We compute the failure rates using ceasing option linked to
either inadequate cash-flows or low sales and lack of business or personal loans/credit.
Using SSBF and SBO data and controlling for characteristics of firms and owners, we
estimate the average difference distinguishing recently purchased and founded firms over five
components: the failure rate, the credit line interest rate, the credit limit, the credit score, and
the profit normalized by the average 2-digits sectoral profit.11 We report the results in Table 2.
The fourth and fifth columns, under the label ∆ Conditional, display the conditional difference
in the specific components. As a reference, the two first columns display the uncontrolled
sample average, respectively for purchased and founded firms, while the third column is
simply the difference between those two values. We compare our results between a pool of
recent firms within 3 years of their acquisition and one of older firms over 15 years of theirs.
Starting with the failure rate, our estimates using the SBO show that purchased firms
are a significant 6.3% less likely to fail. Importantly, contrarily to many surveys considering
the acquisition and establishment date as equivalent, the SBO contains information about the
true establishment year of a business.12 Although imperfect, the establishment year provides
us with a key element: it lets us control for the contribution of a firm established many
years prior to its sale with respect to a recently established and sold firm. Interestingly,
when controlling for the establishment age, the associated failure rate wedge falls to 2.4%
10Guiso et al. (ming) show that that type entrepreneurial knowledge is important for the decision to enter the
sector.
11Specifically, we use the following OLS regression: Ci = α + βDi(purchased) + γXi + εi with Di(purchased) a
dummy indicating whether the business was initially purchased, Ci the specific component and X the vector of
controls. β that captures the difference associated with purchasing relative to founding a businesses.
12This information is available yearly between 2003 to 2007 and is bracketed prior to that as [2000:2002],
[1990:1999], [1980:1989], and [before 1980].
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(last column), implying that this age captures (part of) the difference between a founded
and a purchased firm. A key consequence of this is that the true age of a firm, and thus
how actually mature it is, appears to be a critical factor. This maturity and the associated
advantages it provides might be what a prospective entrepreneur is seeking when purchasing
an existing business. Quite contrastingly, in the pool of older firms, the wedge between
purchased and founded businesses is virtually negligible, and the effect of the establishment
date also disappears. Overall, our result points out that recently purchased firms are less
likely to fail than recently founded firms. Consistently with Dunne et al. (1988), this difference
is partly captured by the fact that purchased firms are in general older (conditional on size,
and other characteristics). In a model of firm dynamics with an entry margin, older firms
are those that survived and were selected over time. From the viewpoint of a new potential
entrepreneur, this selection is not known ex-ante. Following Jovanovic (1982), we argue that an
entrepreneur learns the characteristics and the potential of a new firm mostly on the business
but directly observes the characteristics of older (and purchasable) firms.
Table. 2. Key Heterogeneity Components by Acquisition Type
Acquisition Type ∆ Unconditional ∆ Conditional
Purchased Founded Controlsa +Estab. date
Firms within 3 years of acquisition
Risk: Failure rate 0.087 0.164 −0.077 −0.063∗∗∗ (0.004) -0.024∗∗∗ (0.005)
Financial: Int. rate 10.89 12.12 −1.234 −1.98∗∗ (0.831)
Financial: Granted loanApplied f or 0.994 0.950 0.043 0.061
∗∗ (0.029)
Financial: Credit score 3.316 2.964 0.352 0.526∗∗∗(0.173)
Norm. Profitability 0.710 0.364 0.346 0.431∗ (0.232)
Firms over 15 years after acquisition
Risk: Failure rate 0.023 0.033 −0.010 −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
Financial: Int. rate 12.29 12.38 -0.081 0.229 (0.548)
Financial: Granted loanApplied f or 0.975 0.975 -0.002 0.006 (0.019)
Financial: Credit score 4.024 3.913 0.111 0.155 (0.143)
Norm. Profitability 1.616 1.176 0.420 0.030 (0.326)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Source: SBO, SSBF (2003). The sample comprises owners managing their firms and declar-
ing they constitutes their primary source of income. The first owner is used to select the firm acquisition year.
a Firm and owner controls: depending on the survey, characteristics of owners include age, experience as entrepreneur, educa-
tion, sex, home-based dummy, home equity and other net worth, and number of owners. Characteristics of firms: sector and
FIPS dummies, employment, legal structure, equity, past bankruptcy indicator, urban dummy, payroll and franchise indicator.
Our findings for the failure rate extends to financial and productivity components. In the
SSBF data, recently founded businesses tend to pay, on average, a higher interest rate on their
credit line with respect to recently purchased businesses. The premium is non-negligible at
around 2.0%. Concerning the credit limit, we find that recently purchased businesses obtain
a higher fraction of the loan they applied for. This is also confirmed when using the credit
score as a proxy for credit constraints: recently purchased businesses get a significantly higher
score, of 0.5 on average, on a scale from 1 (lowest score) to 6 (highest score). These findings
suggest that founded businesses face tighter financial constraints, consistently with Sakai
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et al. (2010) and Dyrda (2015).13 Finally, regarding productivity, the ratio of profit relative to
the average profit in the corresponding industry is higher by about 0.4 for purchased firms.
This is consistent with a mean-reverting productivity argument also found in Clementi and
Palazzo (2016) and Warusawitharana (2018), in which new firms enter with an, on average,
lower productivity level and then converge to their long-run productivity level as they age.14
This remains consistent with the argument of the selection of the best firms through time: if
purchased firms are in general older, they already passed this selection phase. Consistently,
in the older pool of firms, the gap between purchased and founded firms either vanishes or
is not significant for financial and productivity components.
In general, the importance of the maturity of a firm is difficult to distinguish from a best
firms/entrepreneurs selection mechanism in cross-sectional data since the latter would also
lead to, for instance, higher average productivity over time as under-performing firms are ex-
iting. By distinguishing recently purchased from founded businesses, our results show that
maturity components are crucial and allow potential purchasers to overcome the selection
process. We argue that our findings concerning the performance divide between purchased
and founded firms and the importance of the maturity of a business for a prospective en-
trepreneur is a key element to incorporate in a model examining business assets transfers.
We relate these findings to a growing literature documenting the importance of intangible
assets (customer bases, client lists, organizational methods, brand value, etc.) in explaining
the market value of a firm. However, as evidenced by Bhandari and McGrattan (2018), the
direct measurement of most intangible assets is a difficult task. But basically, as they cannot
be directly bought and their accumulation is time-intensive, early-stage firms are immature
with low levels of intangibles whereas well-established ones are mature with high levels of in-
tangibles.15, We, here, adopt a parsimonious approach supported by our empirical evidence:
an immature firm will face more stringent credit, productivity and risk conditions whereas a
mature firm will have better perspectives on these components. From the point of view of a
prospective entrepreneur, a business purchase will convey the specific value of maturity and
the business for sale market will play a crucial role in transferring it between owners.16
13As additional evidence, in both the SCF and the SSBF, the main reason given to explain why early-stage
businesses face difficulties in obtaining the credit they apply for is "the firm was not in business long enough" (see
Appendix A.2 for details).
14Unfortunately, the SSBF data does not include the establishment date of firms, making it impossible to control
by this element for financial and profit components.
15Bhandari and McGrattan (2018) also discuss the dynamics of intangible assets accumulation and show how it
is related to the age of a firm. The relation with age is also consistent with the literature on firm dynamics (see
Dunne et al. (1988)).
16This paper focuses solely on transferable assets, whether tangible or intangible. We abstract from non-
transferable intangible asset, such as the managerial value of a specific retiring business owner.
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3 Model
This section introduces a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous buying and
selling decisions. The economy consists of a corporate sector and a unit measure of ex post
heterogeneous agents. A fraction of the latter, called entrepreneurs, hold small and medium-
sized businesses while the remaining, called workers, occupy wage-paying jobs in a corporate
sector. Entry and exit into and out of the small business sector are subject to specific condi-
tions. On the one hand, individuals entering the sector have to either found a new business
or purchase an existing one. On the other hand, upon exit, entrepreneurs can either sell
their business or liquidate the physical business assets. Purchasing and selling are subject to
financial and selling frictions. Therefore, a small and medium-sized enterprises for sale market
(SMESM) constitutes a pivotal piece of our model. Finally, a government levies a menu of
taxes to cover for old-age pensions and other public expenditures.
3.1 Corporate Sector
The corporate sector output Yt is produced by a single competitive representative firm using a
Cobb-Douglas technology with capital share α ∈ (0, 1) and total factor productivity A, capital
level Kc,t and labor Lc,t, such that: Yt = F(Kc,t, Lc,t) = AKαc,tL
1−α
c,t . Capital depreciates at rate δ
in both the corporate and the SME sectors. The interest rate and the wage rate equalize their




We use a stylized life-cycle setup with aging and probabilistic death in the last age bracket.
Households live through J stages of life and the total population, of unit mass, is divided
among J generations indexed with j ∈ [1; J]. Groups 1 through J − 1 are called Juniors and
have access to the labor market. The Jth group, called Seniors, is comprised of individuals
beyond the retirement age. We assume that a fraction pdie of the Seniors pass away and
exit the model.17 Over the life-cycle, households belong in an occupation o ∈ {oe, ow, or}.
Junior households can be entrepreneurs (oe) or occupied in the workforce (ow) whereas Senior
households are either retired (or) or are old age entrepreneurs.





βtU (ct, jt, ot), (1)
where we drop the dependence on time t in the following. The age argument in the utility
function translates the fact that being active beyond the retirement age might generate disu-
tility costs. The occupation argument relates to the assumption that entrepreneurship could
generate non-pecuniary benefits, as argued by Hurst and Pugsley (2015).
17This assumption is widely used in the literature: see Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) in a related literature.
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Depending on its occupation, a household can possess liquid and/or illiquid assets. Liq-
uid assets are akin to savings and are noted a. Illiquid (business) assets, noted k, are used
to produce with the entrepreneurial technology. Both the corporate and the entrepreneurial
sector produce a homogeneous consumption good. The liquid asset can be freely used to pur-
chase it but not the illiquid asset. Our setup explicitly defines conditions to convert illiquid
capital into liquid assets and conversely. To obtain liquid assets from illiquid assets, individu-
als have to either sell their firm contingent on finding a buyer or liquidate partially or totally
subject to an adjustment cost. Conversely, acquiring illiquid capital using liquid capital is
subject to an adjustment cost but can be also achieved by buying a firm with a specific illiq-
uid capital amount. Investing or disinvesting in the illiquid capital are also subject to capital
adjustment costs. These adjustment costs are generally noted C(k, k′), with k′ the next period
capital.
The state-space for an entrepreneur are savings a, business capital k, and xe = {j, m},
where m = {0, 1} indicates whether the business is mature. A newly founded firm is as-
sumed to start immature (m = 0) and has a probability Pm to mature. Only mature firms
can be sold on the SMESM. Thus, all purchased firms are preexisting mature businesses
(m = 1).18 Maturity translates the accumulation of intangible assets and provides specific
benefits. Entrepreneurs are precluded from possessing multiple firms. The state-space for a
worker is a, and xw = {j, y, ι}, with y her working productivity and ι her potential ability
to manage a business. Both ι and y follow first-order Markov processes. We note Y(j, y)
the income of a worker. The entrepreneurial income derives from entrepreneurial production
using technology f (k, m).19
For convenience, the full individual states vector is noted X := (a, k, j, m, ι, y, o) ∈ X. The
states of an entrepreneur are Xe := (a, k, j, m) ∈ Xe and those of a worker are Xw := (a, y, j, ι) ∈
Xw. Let {Φ(X), Φ(Xe), Φ(Xw)} be measures over all agents and each occupation respectively.
3.3 Dynamic Problem
We decompose an agent’s intra-period decision process into a sequence of three subperiods.
In the last subperiod, the consumption-saving and entrepreneurial investment problems are
tackled. In the middle subperiod, the buying and selling problems are addressed contingent
18In detailed business transaction data, we find that only 15% of businesses for sale have been established in
the 5 preceding years. In the SBO 2007, only about 23% of sellers declare selling a firm established in the 4 years
preceding the sale. In pratice, it would be straightforward to allow a fraction of firms to mature directly upon
entry. We believe our results are robust to such an assumption.
19Note that for the sake of parsimony, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we abstract from
entrepreneurs hiring workers and leave it for a straightforward extension. Second, the fact that only mature firms
can be sold on the SMESM reflects that in the data the average age of businesses for sale is much higher than the
average of all firms. Using a dataset of business selling transactions detailed in Appendix A.4, we find that 85%
of businesses for sale are older than 5 years. Moreover, as it takes time to create a valuable business, maturity
captures the process of accumulating intangibles for early-stage firms.
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Figure 3. Timing.
t t + 1
E(a, k, xe)
Cons., Save & InvestOccupational choice
(a′, k′, x′)
Subperiod 1 Subperiod 2 Subperiod 3
Liquidate/Sell/Be idle
t t + 1
W(a, xw)
Cons. & SaveOccupational choice
(a′, k′, x′)
Subperiod 1 Subperiod 2 Subperiod 3
Purchase/Found/Be idle
on occupational changes and the maturity of a business. Finally, in the first subperiod oc-
cupational choices are made. Given that W(a, xw) and E(a, k, xe) are respectively the value
function of a worker and an entrepreneur, Figure 3 summarizes this decomposition. The
intra-period problem is solved backwards and we detail below each subperiod problem.
3.3.1 The Last Subperiod: Consumption-Saving Problem
Depending on choices made in the previous subperiods, consumption and saving decisions
in the last subperiod can be distinguished into those of workers either continuing or exiting
their activity and those of entrepreneurs continuing or exiting theirs. For the sake of simplic-
ity, continuing workers are subject to a no-borrowing constraint. Similarly to an incumbent
entrepreneur, an exiting worker entering an entrepreneurial activity can borrow to invest in
a level of business assets k, as long as a minimum amount θ(m) is pledged. Thus those
individuals are subject to the following borrowing constraint:
a′ ≥ −ψ(k, m) (2)
ψ(k, m) = (1− θ(m))[(1− δ)k− C(k(1− δ), 0)] (3)
where C(k(1 − δ), 0) refers to the liquidation cost (i.e. the adjustment cost from reducing
the capital level from (1− δ)k to 0). We interpret θ(m) as a maturity-specific downpayment
requirement translating the minimum fraction of business assets an entrepreneur has to pro-
vide in order to get a loan. This formulation implicitly assumes that, under a liquidation
procedure, the creditor can only resell the business assets net of depreciation δ. An indebted
entrepreneur faces an interest rb(m) that depends on her net worth, a, and the maturity of
her business, m, such that r̃(m) = 1a′≥0r− 1a′<0rb(m).
Continuing entrepreneurs An incumbent entrepreneur continuing her activity chooses next
period’s illiquid capital k′ and saving a′ given her current income f (k, m). The consumption-
saving problem of this entrepreneur is thus:
Econt(a,k, xe) = max
c>0, a′≥−ψ(k′), k′≥0
{
U (c, j, oe) + βEj′,m′|j,mE(a′, k′, x′e)
}
(4)
s.t. c + a′ + k′ = (1 + r̃(m))a + f (k, m) + k(1− δ)− C(k(1− δ), k′) (5)
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with Econt the subperiod specific value function of this continuing entrepreneur and τw
the tax rate on entrepreneurial income.
Exiting entrepreneurs When exiting, an entrepreneur has to choose savings a′ subject to the
no-borrowing constraint. The value function of an exiting entrepreneur depends on the exit
option z: voluntarily or business failure liquidation (z = 0) or sale of the business (z = 1).
Eexitz (a,k, xe) = max
c>0, a′≥0
{
U (c, j, oe) + βEj′,ι′|jW(a′, x̃′w)
}
(6)
s.t. c + a′ = (1 + r̃(m))a + f (k, m)
+ (1− z)
[










with Eexit the subperiod specific value function of this entrepreneur and x̃′w the specific ex-
ogenous worker state of an exiting entrepreneur.20 Liquidating is identical to adjusting the
business capital to zero by fully paying the corresponding adjustment cost C(k(1− δ), 0). Al-
ternatively, by successfully selling the business the entrepreneur recovers the total amount
P(k(1− δ)).
Continuing workers Such a worker has to choose savings a′ subject to the no-borrowing
constraint and solves:
W cont(a,xw) = max
c>0, a′≥0
{
U (c, j, ow) + βEj′,y′,ι′|j,y,ιW(a′, x′w)
}
(8)
s.t. c + a′ = (1 + r)a + Y(j, y)(1− τw) (9)
with W cont the subperiod specific value function of this worker and τw the tax on labor
income.
Exiting workers An exiting worker enters entrepreneurship by either purchasing an existing
mature business (d = 1 and m′ = 1) and paying the total amount P(k′) plus fixed cost Fb or
by founding a new business (d = 0 and m′ = 0) and paying the adjustment cost C(0, k′).21
Depending on whether the agent is currently buying (d = 1) or founding (d = 0) a firm, her
20The main specificity is the assumption that any new worker coming from the entrepreneurial sector starts
with the lowest level of worker productivity. The argument is that the productivity state y is strongly related to
the experience of a worker in a specific corporate job. This seniority on a job cannot be randomly obtained but has
to be earned. Recall, however, that there is an age-component in the determination of the wage process. Finally,
the entrepreneurial ability of a new worker is drawn from the invariant distribution of the associated process.
21We use the purchase specific fixed cost to bring the model closer to the data by capturing the fact that
purchased firms are twice as large as founded ones in terms of start-up capital. A side effect is that buyers are
prevented from purchasing very small businesses unless their credit constraint can afford this cost. The fixed cost
could capture costs associated to brokerage, screening, negociation or training.
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problem is to choose the optimal next period capital size k′, savings a′ and consumption c.
Such a worker solves:
W exitd (a, xw) = max
c>0, a′≥−ψ(k′),k′≥0
{
U (c, j, ow) + βEj′|jE(a′, k′, x′e)
}
(10)





−(1− d) k′(1 + C(0, k′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Founding
(11)
withW exit the subperiod specific value function.
3.3.2 The Middle Subperiod: Acquisition and Selling Problems
In the middle subperiod, the buying/founding and selling/liquidating problems are solved.
When the sale of a business is unsuccessful, entrepreneurs can continue operating the busi-
ness or may liquidate. Similarly, in the case of an unsuccessful business purchase, a buyer
can remain a worker or found a new business.
The seller’s problem An entrepreneur with a mature business (m = 1) can try to sell (z = 1)
it on the SMESM. A buyer is found with probability hs. Otherwise, the entrepreneur chooses
whether to liquidate (z = 0) or to continue operating the business. Depending on whether
the entrepreneur exits endogenously or is forced to exit, the following problem is solved:22
S ee(a, k, xe) =
(
hsEexitz=1 + (1− hs)max
{
Eexitz=0, E
cont})(a, k, xe) (endogenous exit) (12)
S f e(a, k, xe) =
(
hsEexitz=1 + (1− hs)Eexitz=0
)
(a, k, xe) (forced exit) (13)
where S ee and S f e are the subperiod specific value functions for the endogenous exit and
the forced exit problems.
The buyer’s problem A buyer has a probability hb of finding a seller and purchasing a
business (d = 1). Otherwise, she chooses whether to found a new business (d = 0) or to keep
being a worker. Thus, the following problem is solved:
B(a, xw) =
(





with B(a, xw) the subperiod specific value function for this problem.
3.3.3 The First Subperiod: Occupational Choice and Exit Strategy
Worker A worker starts the period with states {a, xw} and, provided she has an entrepreneurial
ability (i.e. ι = 1), chooses whether to try to purchase an existing business (with value
22We introduce exogenous shocks to capture entrepreneurial exits unrelated to business failure: migration,
death, divorce, etc.
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B(a, xw)), to found a new business (d = 0), or to remain a worker, such that:
W(a, xw) =
(





Entrepreneur An entrepreneur starts the period with states {a, k, xe} and decides whether
to sell, liquidate or continue her business endogenously unless she is forced to exit. χ(m)
is the probability of entrepreneurial exit due to business failure, which is a function of the
maturity of the business, and ζ is the exogenous exit probability, conditional on not failing.
Only businesses that do not fail can be sold. In the end, the following problem is solved:





















Contingent on the entrepreneur not failing (with probability (1− χ(m))), she has a prob-
ability ζ to be forced to exit, and a probability (1− ζ) to choose whether to stay entrepreneur,
liquidate the business or sell the business if the business is mature (m = 1).
3.4 The Small and Medium Sized Enterprises for Sale Market (SMESM)
On the SMESM, businesses sellers and buyers meet in a frictional decentralized market where
transaction failures may result in business liquidation on the side of sellers and, on the other
side, may compel prospective entrepreneurs into founding their businesses. For tractability,
we make a number of assumptions:
Assumption 1. The market is intermediated by passive brokers on both the selling and the buying
side.
Assumption 2. Firms are valued and exchanged in this market using the business pricing function
P(k). When selling a firm, an entrepreneur sells tangible illiquid capital assets at their liquidation




V(k, 1)− V(k, 0)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Maturity value















V(k, 0) = 1 + r
r + χ(0)(1− Pm) + Pm
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with τs the capital gains tax, π(k, m) = f (k, m)− δk a profit unit and p the equilibrium price of a
relative expected cash flow unit.23
Assumption 3. Sellers, buyers, and brokers are price takers. Upon meeting a broker, a seller agrees
on an after-tax selling price P(k). Symmetrically, upon meeting a broker, a buyer agrees on a buying
price P(k). Consequently, brokers are making no profit.
With these assumption, we avoid the challenging multidimensional dynamic sorting prob-
lem of the direct matching between heterogeneous buyers and sellers, which may require each
individual to forecast the dynamics of the entire distribution of sellers and purchasers. In-
stead, with the above assumptions, the equilibrium condition requires the price p to clear the



























with hs and hb the respective frictions (or mismatch probability) on the sellers’ and buyers’
side of the market.
In this specification, cash flow units are indistinguishable. Therefore, selling a firm is here
consistent with providing to the market all cash flow units and tangible business assets owned
by the entrepreneur at the same time. Conversely, buying a firm is equivalent to collecting
available cash flow units until the endogenously decided capital size k is attained and then
paying the total price P(k). We argue that a number of elements support this specification.
First, it lets us recover in a stylized manner that entire businesses are exchanged without
changing global value. Second, it stresses that businesses can be bought not only by a single
individual but by several individuals associated together.
These assumptions let us capture the fact that selling a business cannot be reduced to
selling only its tangible assets. Instead, the value recovered after a transaction should cover
the discounted value of future profits.24 We convey this idea here through the fact that the
price p is an abstract object. It is determined at the global equilibrium between cash flow units
sold and bought translating at the same time the intertemporal (since holding businesses
provide an expected stream of future profits) and intangible (with maturity affecting the
relative value of buying versus founding) values of a business.
Finally, this pricing specification ensures that the value associated with selling a business
is always higher than the liquidation value. A price p = 0 would mean that businesses are
23Our price specification closely resemble the pricing found on business selling marketplaces where the selling
price is computed based on total cash flow added to the asset value. Further details on business selling transaction
data are provided in Appendix A.4.
24Using the ValuSource business for sale transaction data, we estimate a ratio of intangible assets over the
business price of about 38% for the median and 54% for the mean. Moreover, Bhandari and McGrattan (2018)
find that there is little cross-sectional dispersion in intangible assets valuation, supporting our choice of a single
price p for all cash flow units.
18
sold at their liquidation value and that the market does not price maturity. Consequently, in
equilibrium, it should be that p > 0 whenever the mass of sellers and buyers is positive.
3.5 Demography and Bequest
The model features multiple generations of individuals. An individual in the last age bracket
has a probability pdie to die. In such a case, the individual is assumed to be reborn as a worker
with age j = 0, with the ownership of the net of estate taxation bequest. Estate taxation
is defined by the tax rate τa on every unit of a bequest left to the descendant. When an
entrepreneur dies, we assume that the business is liquidated and that the debt is reimbursed.
The remaining becomes initial wealth for the newly born worker.25
3.6 Government
The government collects revenues from labor income taxes and pensions (defined as the
amount Y(J, y)), as well as from estate taxation and taxes on the sale of businesses. Govern-
ment expenditures comprise an exogenous government spending proportional to aggregate

















1j=J pdieτaa(X) dΦ(X) = GY +
∫
Xw
Y(J, y) dΦ(Xw) (21)
3.7 Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium consists of value functions for entrepreneurs and workers{
Econt(Xe), Eexitz (X










a′(X), k′(X), d(Xw), z(Xe), c(Xe)
}
and occupational choices, factor prices {w, r}, a
price p for a unit of business profit, and government spending G such that:
1. Household optimize value functions and decision rules by solving problems (4)-(16).
2. The labor and capital markets clear. Total labor demand by the corporate sector equals
household labor supply. The wage is determined by the marginal productivity of la-
bor in the corporate sector, such that Lc =
∫
Xw h(j)ydΦ(X
w). Corporate capital and




X a(X)dΦ(X). The interest rate is determined by the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital in the corporate sector.26
25We also studied a version with a voluntary bequest motive in which older individuals value the utility of their
descendants with a warm-glow utility function of the form V(a). The results are qualitatively similar.
26By a no arbitrage condition factor prices are identical in the entrepreneurial and the corporate sectors.
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3. The government budget constraint in (21) is balanced with G.27
4. The SMESM clears such that the price p in the pricing function (17) equates the value
of relative expected cash flow units sold to those bought in equilibrium.
5. The distribution of agents Φ(x) is induced by decision rules and exogenous shocks and
is summarized by the transition matrix of the system M(X′, Φ′|X, Φ). A steady state
implies a stationary measure Φ(X).
This problem has no analytical solution and has to be solved numerically. Two main
computational challenges arise. First, the dimensionality of the problem with two assets is
large and fast optimization methods are required. Second, due to the presence of both discrete
(occupational choices) and continuous choices, first-order conditions are no longer sufficient
while still necessary. Our computation strategy follows a version of the Discrete Continuous
Endogenous Grid Method (DC-EGM) developed in Iskhakov et al. (2017) with taste shocks to
smooth kinks. Our specific algorithm is discussed in Appendix B.1.
4 Parameterization
We parameterize the model to match microdata on the purchasing and selling margins, oc-
cupational choices, and life-cycle patterns. We compute the moments using the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) averaged from 2000 to 2008, the SCF averaged over the 2001, 2004 and
2007 waves, and finally the 2007 SBO. We pin down a number of parameters by normalizing
them or by relying on values widely used in the literature. We then jointly set the rest of the
parameters to match key moments in the data with their model counterpart.
4.1 Fixed Parameters
Demography and preferences We set J = 9, with 8 stages to represent adult working life,
of 5 years each, and a last bracket to capture all ages beyond the retirement threshold. We
use the following utility function:
U (c, j, o) = (c
1−σ − 1)
1− σ − 1j=JuR + 1o=oe uE (22)
with relative risk aversion σ = 1.5 and uR and uE are jointly endogenously calibrated.28 Senior
households face an additional utility cost uR when operating a business, in order to translate
the difficulty of still being active in old age.
27In the benchmark economy, we set τw and let G adjust. In counterfactual experiments, we keep G to its
benchmark value and adjust the tax rate τw.
28Since a complete characterization of preference heterogeneity is outside the scope of this paper, we assume
a unique IES-risk aversion parameter σ. However, risk aversion has been shown to have a key role on en-
trepreneurial decisions (see for instance Herranz et al. (2015)). In our setup, due to maturity-specific risk, high
risk aversion individuals would rather purchase than found. We leave this very relevant issue for future research.
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Earnings and retirement The labor income process is particularly important for the decision
to become an entrepreneur as it lets workers accumulate sufficient wealth to run valuable
businesses when they are endowed with the entrepreneurial ability.29
We define labor earnings as a function of the wage level w, an age-dependent component
h(j) and a persistent stochastic process for labor productivity y such that:
log(Yi,t(j, y)) = log(wt) + log(yi,t) + log(hi,t(j)) ∀j ∈ {0, ..., J} (23)




i,t ∼ N (0, σy) (24)
We discretize the process for y by setting ρy = 0.96 and adjusting the variance to σy = 0.2
to generate an earnings Gini of 0.36. When j = J, h(j) defines the retirement pension that we
set to 40% of the average income. Once retired, an individual keeps the same component y
forever and her offsprings’ productivity is drawn from the invariant distribution.
Otherwise, the components h(j) for j ∈ {1, ..., J − 1} are chosen in order to replicate the
average lifetime earning profile within each earning percentile as in Guvenen et al. (2015).30
Additionally, the probability of dying, pdie, is set to 0.091 (corresponding to an expected
retirement period of 11 years). The benchmark labor tax rate τw is set to 0.15.
Adjustment costs and liquidation value Incumbent and entering business owners pay a
cost C(k, k′) to adjust entrepreneurial capital from k to k′. For tractability, we assume those
adjustment costs are linear, with φu the per-unit cost.31 At the other end, there are transaction
costs when selling business assets. In particular, we assume that for each unit of business




φu(k′ − k) k′ > k
φd(k− k′) k < k′
(25)
We set φd to 30%, corresponding to a business capital recovery rate of the of 70%, which
is in the range of the average liquidation costs reported in Alderson and Betker (1995). For
the sake of parsimony, we normalize φu to 0.32
Business maturity and intangible value This paper quantifies the importance of the SMESM
when owners can sell both the physical capital assets and the intangible value of their firm.
To quantify the importance of the SMESM, we must consistently match that intangible value,
29Three saving motives arise in the model. A precautionary one due to the inherent productivity risk, a life-cycle
one, and an entrepreneurial motive in order to acquire and run a larger, more profitable firm.
30We provide the values in Appendix B.2.
31Assuming linear cost greatly simplify the complexity of the problem by avoiding to keep track of the past
capital level when investing or disinvesting.
32We perform sensitivity analysis on the effect of this parameter in Appendix C.
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translated in the model by maturity components. An immature business switches from early-
stage to mature with a yearly probability of 20% (about 5 years in operation). Maturity allows
businesses to be sold and implies some additional benefits: (i) a lower interest rate charged
on the debt, (ii) a higher borrowing limit, (iii) higher profitability, and (iv) a lower probability
to fail. All these elements have been highlighted in Section 2 and we discuss in Section 6.2
the importance of each component for the intangible value of a business.
A mature business pays a lower interest rate on its financing, translating the higher
amount of information that a creditor has access to (i.e. history of past transactions, client
lists, etc.), which is intrinsically part of the intangible business value. We therefore define the
debtor interest rate as rb(m) = r + υs + υm1m=0, where υs is a wedge common to all businesses
while υm is the additional interest rate premium charged on early-stage businesses. We set
υs = 2%, the usual value used in the literature. The wedge charged on immature firms is set
to 1.5% in line with our estimates.
The borrowing limit tightness θ(m = 1) is set to 0.3: entrepreneurs have to provide a
down payment of 30%. In total, entrepreneurs can borrow up to (1− θ(0))(1− φd) = 49%
of the business assets k, and therefore provide the remaining 51%, which is close to the 50%
assumed in Herranz et al. (2015).33 We estimate that for firms within 4 years of their purchase
or foundation, the former ones are granted about 3-4 percentage points higher loans than
the latter. Accordingly, we choose θ(m = 0) = 0.35, corresponding to a borrowing limit of
0.455%.
We adopt a conservative 10% profit rate wedge which is lower than our estimate from the
data but is closer to the wedge in Clementi and Palazzo (2016) for new entrants relative to
old incumbents.34 We therefore normalize f (k, 0) = γ(0)kν and f (k, 1) = γ(1)kν, with ν < 1
and γ(1) = 1.1γ(0). Parameters ν and γ(0) are part of the joint calibration.
Finally, we discussed in Section 2 that a key advantage of purchasing an existing business
is a substantial reduction in the probability of failure in the first years after the acquisition.
We convey this idea in the model by pinning down χ(m), the probability of failure. In the
2016 ASE, the fraction of early-stage business owners (within 5 years of acquisition) exiting
for reasons related only to business conditions account for 50% of total exits.35 We, therefore,
set χ(0) to 50% of the average exit rate of newly created businesses, the latter being around 20
to 25%. Consequently, χ(0) = 0.12. Then, using the 2007 SBO, we estimate a difference of 7
percentage points in the likelihood to fail of mature firms with respect to early-stage ones for
recently acquired businesses. We thus set χ(1) = 0.05. We then endogenously adjust ζ, the
33In Appendix C we provide sensitivity analyses on this parameter and show that the model properties are
broadly unaffected by reasonable changes to this parameter.
34In Appendix C, we double the wedge associated to this component as a robustness exercise. All the quantita-
tive results are magnified following the larger gap in maturity value between early-stage and mature firms.
35The ASE survey question regarding the reasons to cease has multiple choices. This number is the total of
business failure responses over the total number of responses excluding other reasons.
22
probability of exogenous entrepreneurial exit (independently of business maturity), to match
a realized entrepreneurial exit rate of 15%.
Matching probabilities Buyers and sellers are subject to selling frictions captured by the
respective probabilities of finding a seller (hb) and a buyer (hs). Given the scarcity of business
transactions data, measuring those probabilities pose a challenge, in particular for small and
middle-sized businesses. On the seller side, we circumvent this issue by relying on a new
dataset of business selling transactions from a leading U.S. online marketplace. This dataset
includes more than 90,000 observations and provides various business-specific characteristics
such as age, size, cash-flow, EBITDA, the fraction of fixed assets, the number of employees,
etc. In contrast to other business transactions data, we continuously observe businesses for
sale and closed transactions over time, allowing us to construct a panel dataset of businesses
for sale. We provide a detailed overview of this dataset in Appendix A.4.
We use the above data to infer the probability that a business is sold within a year by
constructing a daily panel of businesses for sale between 2018 and 2019. We then construct
cohorts of those businesses and compute the total number of sold businesses over time. We
exclude from the cohorts all the businesses that were removed from the listings without
resulting in a sale.36 Then, a year after the first listing dates, we compute the fraction of sold
businesses relative to the total initial number of businesses for sale within the cohort. The
resulting indicator provides the fraction of businesses for sale that is actually sold after a
year. Using this indicator, we find that the average probability of selling a business is about
30% after a year. This probability displays a slight size-dependence. Taking the price as a
proxy for size, we find that firms with a listing price below 500K dollars (resp. above 1000K
dollars) have a probability of being sold of 35% (resp. 27%) after a year. Therefore, we pick a
conservative estimate for the probability of finding a buyer with hs = 0.3.
Other parameters The corporate sector features a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
production function with capital share α = 0.34. Total factor productivity is normalized to
A = 1 and capital depreciates at rate δ = 0.07 in both sectors. The estate taxation is set to
30%, consistently with the statutory tax rate in the U.S. and the value used in Cagetti and
De Nardi (2009).
In the U.S., capital gains following the sale of a business are taxed at a statutory tax
rate between 0% and 20%. We choose a benchmark tax of 10%. Finally, we calibrate the
transition probability of the entrepreneurial ability process ι: we endogenously determine
pι = P(ι′ = 1|ι = 0) and we restrict P(ι′ = 0|ι = 1) = χ(0).
36Results are qualitatively similar if we include those businesses, while the magnitude of the probabilities is
lowered by around 15-20%. We posit that excluding vanishing businesses from the stock of businesses for sale
lets us exclude businesses that are not performing well from the sample.
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Table. 3. Fixed parameters
Parameter Value Description
σ 1.5 Risk-aversion coefficient
{δ, α} {0.07, 0.34} Depreciation rate, Corporate returns to scale
{ρy, σy} {0.96, 0.2} Earnings process
h(j) See Appendix B.2 Life-cycle earnings
pdie 0.091 Probability of dying during retirement
hs 0.3 Probability of selling the business within a year
φd 30% Liquidation recovery rate
{τs, τa} {10%, 30%} Selling and estate tax rates
Pm 20% Probability of maturing
{υs, υm} {2%, 1.5%} Interest rate wedge for immature/mature businesses
χ(m) {12%, 5%} Exogenous probability to fail
γ(m = 1) 1.1γ(m = 0) Profitability wedge (10%)
4.2 Joint Parameterization
The remaining nine parameters are chosen jointly so that the model matches nine moments
of the U.S. economy related to the small business market, entrepreneurship, and the wealth
distribution. The discount factor β helps to match a capital-output ratio of 3.2, computed
using the Penn World Table 9.1. The probability of being endowed with an entrepreneurial
ability pι captures the fraction of entrepreneurs in the working-age population, which ranges
between 7% to 12% in the data, depending on the survey, the period considered and the
definition. We choose a target of 11%. The probability to fail for exogenous reasons ζ helps
to match the exit rate of entrepreneurs, which is equal to 15% in the PSID, according to
Mankart and Rodano (2015). Entrepreneurial ability scale γ(0) helps to match a share of
small business GDP of 46%, as reported in Kobe (2012) for 2008, while the return to scale ν
helps to match the wealth Gini coefficient of 0.81. The purchasing fixed cost captures the ratio
of the mean capital of purchased business relative to founded ones which is 2.2 in the SSBF,
and hb helps to recover a fraction of purchased businesses of 22% (SCF) upon entry.37 Finally,
preference parameters uE and uR help to capture the ratio of the median net worth between
entrepreneurs and workers of 7.0 which is closely what is observed in the SCF, and the about
5% of entrepreneurs in the last age bracket.
Our model is exactly identified, with nine parameters used to pin down nine moments.
The resulting parameter values are reported in Table 4.
37The mean capital of purchased business relative to founded ones is computed by comparing firms within 5
years of acquisition.
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Table. 4. Model parameters calibrated within the model a
Description Symbol Value Data Model Source/Main moment c
Discount factor β 0.910 3.20 3.24 Capital-output ratio (Penn World Table 9.1)
Returns to scale priv. bus. ν 0.845 0.81 0.81 Wealth Gini coefficient
Buyer’s matching friction hb 0.331 22.0 24.0 % purchasing bus. (SCF)
Prob. to fail for exo reasons ζ 0.081 15.0 14.9 % exiting self-employed (PSID)
Disutility of working (retired) uR 1.601 4.87 4.84 % retired entrepreneurs (SCF)
Non-pecuniary benefits uE 1.490 7.00 6.80 Ratio median net worth E/W
Buying fixed cost Fb 1.271 2.20 2.22 Ratio mean K buying/founding (SSBF)
Probability entrep. ability b pι 0.020 11.0 11.3 % share of entrepreneurs to workers (SCF)
Entrepreneurial ability scale γ(0) 0.570 46.0 45.1 % share of small business GDP, SBA
a The main moments are indicative. Changing one endogenous parameter affects the whole equilibrium. All
targets are matched within an interval lower than 10%.
b Computations using the CPS are averaged from 2001 to 2008.
c The share of GDP attributable to small businesses (less than 250 employees) in the U.S. is taken from the OECD
estimates.
5 Properties of the Baseline Model
5.1 Model Validation
In this section, we validate our framework by reporting key model generated statistics that
were not targeted in the joint parameterization. In our baseline model, the entrepreneurial
sector holds around 47% of total capital which is slightly higher than the 40% reported in
Quadrini (2000). We find a fraction of mature businesses of 66%. This is comparable to the
statistics reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics: 64% of businesses were 5 years or more
in 2003 and the corresponding number is 62% in 2010. This fraction is generated by the
probability to mature (Pm) and the fraction of mature businesses that are transferred between
individuals through the SMESM. The fraction of agents with zero net worth in the population
is 14%, against 12% in Quadrini (2000).
While we pin down the probability of selling a business within a year, the baseline gen-
erates a ratio of sellers to exiting entrepreneurs of about 9.9%, against 7% to 20% in the 2007
SBO, the 2014-2016 ASE, and the NLSY79. Regarding life-cycle characteristics, Figure 4a dis-
plays the baseline density of entrepreneurs by age bracket compared to the distribution in the
2007 SCF. Similarly, Figure 4b compares the baseline density by age bracket of entrepreneurs
exiting by selling their business to both the 2007 SBO and to business assets in the PSID av-
eraged over the 1989-2015 waves. The model replicates reasonably well the life-cycle patterns
of an average entrepreneur in the economy. It is especially relevant here as we are interested
in characterizing who sells and buys businesses. We also find that the ratio of business assets
sold in the last age bracket (65 and over) relative to the total business assets being sold is
about 44% in the PSID averaged over the 1989-2016 waves. The corresponding number in the
baseline is 33%. However, note that in the PSID, we can not distinguish between business
assets sold as part of the sale of entire businesses and liquidations of fractions of business
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assets. Our baseline number is only about entire business sales. Regarding the age of entry
into entrepreneurship, we find a mean age of 44 for both founders and purchasers in the
2007 SCF while it is respectively 45 and 46.8 in the model.38 On the exit side, the mean age
of business asset sellers is 53.7 in the PSID, while it is 52.4 in the model. Thus, consistently
with the data, the entrepreneurial life-cycle appears to be a key component of both the model
and the SMESM. In an alternative economy where we double the disutility cost uR associated
with working while in retirement, we observe a decrease in the fraction of individuals in the
last age bracket from 4.8% in the baseline to 1.4%. At the same time, the fraction of business
sellers substantially increases to reach 12.3% and the business price p reduces from 0.17 to
0.16 (see Appendix C for details).
Figure 4. Life-cycle pattern of entrepreneurship








































Note: we report the survey weighted density for the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) and the 2007 Survey
of Business Owners (SBO) and the PSID (averaged from 1989 to 2015, deflated). Baseline reports the exact same
densities in the model.
Finally, the baseline model is also able to closely reproduce wealth concentration and
inequality statistics. We delay this discussion to Section 6.4.
5.2 The Decision to Enter Entrepreneurship
The selection in and out of entrepreneurship is a key element of our model. The main drivers
leading individuals to select into entrepreneurship is wealth and entrepreneurial ability. Fol-
lowing the literature, non-pecuniary benefits appear as an additional driver. Concerning the
type of acquisition, fixed costs Fb lead wealth-poor individuals to enter entrepreneurship
by founding instead of purchasing. Figure 5a displays the model-based decision to enter
entrepreneurship and the type of acquisition as a function of wealth for an entrant with av-
38Our comparison point is new entrepreneurs within 4 years of firm ownership. Notice that in the CPS, the
average entry age into entrepreneurship is 43 in 1996 and 48 in 2016. Using the SSBF, we find no clear difference
between the age of buyers and founders, as shown in table 11 of Appendix A.2. In the model, we use the midpoint
within an age bracket to compute the mean age.
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erage working productivity. Conditional on always finding an existing business, wealthy
individuals would rather purchase an existing mature business instead of founding a new
one. However, the existence of matching frictions (hb > 0) suggests that only 33% of poten-
tial purchasers will match a seller. Consistently with the fact that purchasers are in general
wealthier, the ratio of the mean net worth between recent purchasers and founders is about
2.8 in the SCF (2007). In the model, this ratio is about 2.1.
Figure 5. Occupational choice and start-up capital as a function of wealth for new entrants.
(a) Occupational choice
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Note: panel (a) displays the behavior of an hypothetical worker (j = 4, y = 2 and ι = 1) when faced with the
alternatives of entering entrepreneurship either by founding or purchasing and remaining a worker. Panel (b)
displays the behavior of an hypothetical entrant with j = 4. Notice that the probability to switch occupations is
not binary due to the perturbation method used to smooth the kinks generated by the occupational choices.
Alongside the decision to buy or found, a prospective entrepreneur also chooses the
amount of start-up capital. In Figure 5b, we display a typical model-based start-up capital
policy function for a new entrepreneur deciding either to buy an existing business or found
a new one. There is a threshold below which agents found and above which they purchase.
The exact position of the threshold is state-dependent. We illustrate the case of an individ-
ual in a middle-age bracket for whom the threshold is at a net worth around 750K dollars.
Purchasing a size k business is more expensive than founding one of the same size. This is
due to the intangible value embedded in a purchased firm which incentivizes entrepreneurs
to buy an existing mature business even when the initial size is smaller. Finally, the slope
difference between the purchasing and the founding curves is generated by two components.
First, founders face a tighter borrowing constraint because θ(0) > θ(1). Second, the nature of
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the business price leads to decreasing returns to scale when buying larger businesses. This is
due to the concavity of the production function reflected in the maturity value that enters the
pricing formula P(k) together with the fact that the liquidation value is (1− φd) < (1 + φu).
As a consequence, as shown in Figure 5c, the average price P(k)/k declines as the purchased
business capital increases, leading to higher start-up capital when entrepreneurs are able to
purchase larger businesses.
We finally show in Figures 6a and 6b the distribution of start-up capital as a function of
business acquisition type: foundation or purchase. The model generates a consistent right-
skewed distribution of start-up capital. Moreover, the distribution of purchased businesses
is shifted to the right relative to that of founded ones.39 To further relate the above points
to empirical observations, in the SSBF, among firms within 3 years of their acquisition, the
ratio of total firms assets between purchased and founded firms is about 3.7. In terms of the
number of employees, profit and total sales, these ratios are respectively 2.1, 2.1 and 3.8 (see
Appendix A.2 for details). We observe similar evidence using the median ratio. From this,
we infer that purchased businesses are indeed substantially larger upon acquisition, a feature
that the model captures well.






















Note: we normalize start-up capital by the median net worth in the baseline model and the data. The straight line
corresponds to founded businesses while the dashed line to purchased businesses. The corresponding vertical
lines indicate the mean normalized start-up capital for each density.
5.3 The Decision to Exit Entrepreneurship
Our baseline model is consistent with several features of entrepreneurial exit. Most notably,
it is able to capture the exit behavior of firms with respect to their maturity. In Table 5, we
compare the survival rates of firms in our model to both the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
39Notice however that our resulting distribution of start-up capital for purchased businesses is less dispersed
relative to the data. An extension with an heterogeneous fixed cost Fb in the range of Clementi and Palazzo (2016)
would generate such a distribution. For instance, increasing Fb to 2.0 raises the average firm size of purchased
businesses from 20.2 in the baseline to 22.4.
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Knaup and Piazza (2007) data. We start with the survival rate relative to the establishment
year: our baseline replicates it well in the first years but underestimates it after 6 years.
This comes from the fact that for mature businesses, the failure rate, given by ζ + χ(1) is
somewhat constant.40 However, a model without maturity and constant exit rate, such as the
one in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), would underestimate the survival rate even more: after 5
years, such a model has a survival rate lower by 5 percentage points relative to our baseline.
Moreover, the model captures quite well the increasing survival rate as firms mature.41 In
Section 6, we discuss the central role of maturity in our model, relating it to the intangible
value of a firm embedded in the purchasing option. Interestingly, in the data, the survival
rate relative to the preceding year substantially increases between 4 and 5 years, which may
indicate that firms start to be well-established after that. This supports our calibration of the
probability to switch from immature to mature with an average of 5 years in the early-stage.
Table. 5. Survival rate: model versus data
Number of years
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 10y
Survival rate relative to first year
U.S. data (BLS) 80.1 68.7 60.2 52.6 46.8 43.2 33.8
U.S. data (Knaup and Piazza (2007)) 81.2 65.8 54.3 44.4 38.3 34.4 –
Baseline model 80.8 66.4 55.3 46.5 39.5 33.7 19.6
Zero probability to mature a 80.8 65.4 52.8 42.7 34.5 27.9 11.9
Survival rate relative to the preceding year
U.S. data (BLS) 80.1 85.8 87.6 87.4 89.0 92.3 94.1
U.S. data (Knaup and Piazza (2007)) 81.2 81.0 82.6 81.7 86.3 89.9 –
Baseline model 80.8 82.1 83.2 84.1 84.9 85.4 86.7
Zero probability to mature a 80.8 80.8 80.8 80.8 80.8 80.8 80.8
a This is the survival rate when entrepreneurs are not allowed to mature using the same panel of entrepreneurs.
Overall, the baseline model’s ability to appropriately replicate a number of key features
of the data that were not targeted during the joint parameterization seems sound to us.
40In a recent paper, Fairlie et al. (2018) document survival rate differences between start-ups with and without
employees, as well as the dependence on the legal form. Our estimates are in the range of theirs.
41The fact that the model survival rate is lower as compared to the BLS data can be explained by their specific
definition: their survival rate is constructed using establishment openings (new businesses consisting of both
establishments that are created and establishments that are reopening, including establishments that open on a
seasonal basis). Moreover, the difference with the data is quite large after 10 years. Nevertheless, the model does
match the difference in survival rates one year after acquisition between founded businesses and purchased ones,
which is more likely to be relevant for agents deciding between those two options. Moreover, the data reports
the survival rate of firms with at least one employee. In practice, the model also accounts for self-employed
businesses that may have lower survival rates. See Knaup and Piazza (2007) for further details.
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6 Businesses for Sale Market: Quantitative Analysis
This model is the first to feature a businesses for sale market (SMESM) letting entrepreneurs
transfer their business assets to a different owner. Thus, this section presents our quantitative
assessment of the importance of that market and the associated maturity components. We
show that the ability to build a firm’s maturity is a critical component of that market and its
outcomes. We emphasize two dimensions: the aggregate outcomes and the cross-sectional
implications on occupational choices, the distribution of firms, and wealth inequality.
6.1 Assessing the Importance of Business Transfers
We first investigate the counterfactual in which the SMESM is missing. In this alternative
economy, all new entrants must found a new immature business and all exiting entrepreneurs
must liquidate their assets. We consider two situations: a general equilibrium (GE) case where
prices and labor tax τw adjust and a partial equilibrium (PE) case where prices and taxes are
kept at the baseline level. Table 6 reports the results.
Without the SMESM and, thus, in the absence of any business transfers, the steady-state
decline in aggregate output is substantial at 10.5%. This drop is mostly due to the 18.7%
decrease in the SME sector production, accounting only for 41% of total production against
45% in the baseline. As a side effect, aggregate savings also decline by almost 15%, which
leads to a corporate sector production drop of 3.8%. Overall, 80% of the loss is attributable
to the decrease in the SME sector production, while 20% is coming from a lower corporate
output.
Interestingly, the decline in aggregate savings has important effects on prices: the interest
rate is higher and the wage rate is lower in equilibrium.42 These GE effects somewhat coun-
teract the potential corporate output loss: in the PE case, aggregate savings losses are much
larger. In the absence of price adjustments, the steady-state aggregate output would decrease
by 13% with a 21% drop of aggregate savings.
Table. 6. Aggregate outcomes with and without the SMESM






U.S. data a – – – – 46.0 3.20 – – –
Baseline with SMESM 2.38 – 1.31 1.07 7.70 45.1 3.24 4.9 % 1.18 15.0 %
No SMESM (GE) 2.13 -11% 1.26 0.87 6.56 40.8 3.07 5.6 % 1.15 16.0 %
No SMESM (PE) 2.07 -13% 1.21 0.86 6.07 41.4 2.94 4.9 % 1.18 15.0 %
a The U.S. share of output produced in the SME sector is taken from Kobe (2012). Yc and YSME refer respectively
to the corporate and the SME sector output.
In Table 7, we compare our baseline to the alternatives described above but along the
42Moreover, notice that the labor income tax increases since a higher fraction of older individuals are not
working and there are no government revenues from business transfers.
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lines of occupational decisions and firm size distribution. Without the SME for sale market,
the fraction of entrepreneurs diminishes by about 0.3 percentage points. A larger drop is
partly offset by higher incentives to enter entrepreneurship coming from lower wages and
a higher interest rate, the latter letting workers accumulate more capital. Surprisingly, even
without price changes, the entry rate increases. This is directly linked to the absence of a
SMESM. Indeed, we find that entrepreneurial entry decisions are not comparable with and
without the SMESM. One key reason is the natural incentive to wait for a future opportunity
after an unsuccessful attempt to buy an existing business. Such a mechanism is absent in
current entrepreneurial models in the literature. As we illustrate in Figure 7, this mechanism
conditions the nature of entry in the sector: the dashed (blue) line reports the probability to
enter the sector by founding a business in a setting without the SMESM whereas the dotted
(green) line reports the probability to enter by founding conditional on not finding a business
to purchase in a setting with a SMESM. With respect to net worth, there is a significant gap
between these two lines relating to the incentive to wait. Upon not finding a business to
purchase, for a large range of net worths, prospective entrepreneurs will choose to rather
wait for a future purchase opportunity. For the same range of net worth, without a SMESM,
prospective entrepreneurs can only found and enter resulting in an appreciable difference in
the type of entrepreneurial firms that can be generated by the two settings. In this range
of net worth, the setting with a SMESM would produce mature firms entry corresponding
to business transfers instead of new firms of similar sizes resulting in a diverging pool of
firms in the economy. As a comparison point, the solid (red) line indicates the baseline
probability to purchase instead of founding. For similar reasons, Table 7 shows that the exit
rate increases: in the baseline sellers who are unable to find a buyer might postpone their
exit. In the alternative, exiting entrepreneurs can only liquidate their assets and all exits are
immediate. This feature also leads old owners (above 65 years of age) to exit entrepreneurship
earlier. The fraction of entrepreneurs in the last bracket falls from 4.83% in the baseline to
4.58% without the SMESM.




Mature a Entry b Exit b Average size
% % % k k entry k exit
Baseline with SMESM 11.27 66.0 1.797 14.94 45.0 11.8 41.3
No SMESM (GE) 10.99 53.2 1.838 15.74 36.1 9.1 32.0
No SMESM (PE) 10.90 53.2 1.824 15.74 35.9 8.5 31.7
a This column measures the share of mature (m = 1) businesses in the economy.
b The entry rate is computed as the ratio of workers entering entrepreneurship relative to the total population
of workers. The exit rate is computed as the ratio of entrepreneurs exiting entrepreneurship relative to the total
population of entrepreneurs.
Without the SMESM, valuable existing businesses are liquidated instead of being trans-
ferred, resulting in two especially remarkable findings concerning the distribution of firms.
First, the share of mature businesses falls by a considerable 13 percentage points, implying
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that the SMESM alone is a key market in transferring overall business maturity. As a result,
the economy is faced with a substantial loss in intangible assets due to the impossibility to
transfer them. Second, there is a significant decrease in the average firm size due to both the
overall increase in the failure rate and the lower average start-up capital upon entry. Indeed,
without the SMESM, immature businesses are founded resulting in a higher failure rate as
compared to mature ones. Consequently, a smaller number of businesses are accumulating
productive capital over time, reducing aggregate output. As smaller firms enter, the over-
all distribution of firm sizes is shifted to the left and the average firm size upon exit is also
significantly lower (by about 22%). In other words, the possibility to transfer business assets
through the SMESM creates an environment where firms expand without loosing intangible
value.
6.2 Decomposing Maturity Effects on the Businesses for Sale Market
In this section, we further detail the importance of maturity on aggregate outcomes and entry
decisions. To that end, based on our finding documented in Section 2, we decompose the
wedges generating components of maturity: (i) the profit rate, (ii) the interest rate charged
on the debt, (iii) the failure rate and (iv) the borrowing constraint tightness. Our approach
is to set each maturity component to its average value in the benchmark economy.43 To
help our decomposition, we distinguish the following alternative economies with respect to
our baseline case: case (1) removes the SMESM entirely, case (2) removes all maturity effects
making the SMESM inoperative and cases (3) through (6) remove each of the specific maturity
components one at a time. Table 8 displays the results of this decomposition.
We find the failure rate and the profit rate to be the most significant components of ma-
turity as emphasized by case (6) and then (5). When removing those two components, the
proportion of business buyers in the population of new entrepreneurs is substantially re-
43For instance, concerning the failure rate, as 53% of businesses are mature and 47% are immature without
differential failure rate, we set χ(1) = χ(0) = 0.915 such that we broadly recover the same failure rate as in the
benchmark economy.
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duced. While the profit rate component substantially increases the returns associated with
running a business, the lower failure rate of a mature business largely decreases the risks
associated with entrepreneurial activities. The latter generates higher returns while the former
increase the persistence of entrepreneurial returns. Consistently, our results confirm that the
option to buy an existing business offers an appealing and empirically relevant mechanism
through which prospective entrepreneurs can reduce the risks associated with early-stage en-
trepreneurship. As a consequence, the fraction of mature businesses in the economy falls,
which, in turn, lowers aggregate output. In contrast, the interest rate and borrowing limit
components have marginal aggregate effects despite slightly reducing the fraction of buyers
and the average business size. In fact, the lower average firm size coming from more stringent
borrowing constraints and financial conditions does not significantly impact aggregate out-
comes. Consistently, in case (2), where we remove all four of the components above, we find
substantial deviations from the baseline. This supports the fact that not taking into account
the importance of firm maturity and the accumulation of intangibles would significantly lower
aggregate outcomes as well as the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy.44
Overall, maturity components and their potential transfer on a market is a fundamental
interaction supporting the underlying mechanisms of entry and exit in the entrepreneurial
sector, the firm distribution and aggregate outcomes.










rs% % % size
Baseline with SMESM 11.3% 24.0 9.96 66 45 2.4 0.45 3.24 4.9%
(1) No SMESM 11.0% – – 53 36 2.1 0.41 3.07 5.6%
(2) No maturity components 11.1% – – 49 27 1.9 0.35 2.93 6.0%
(3) No int. rate component rb 11.3% 23.0 9.89 66 43 2.3 0.44 3.21 5.0%
(4) No borr. cst component θ 11.3% 22.6 9.74 65 43 2.3 0.44 3.21 5.0%
(5) No profit rate component γ 11.4% 19.6 9.59 64 38 2.2 0.42 3.15 5.4%
(6) No failure rate component χ 11.0% 10.7 7.6 55 31 2.0 0.38 3.02 5.6%
6.3 Businesses for Sale Market and Matching Efficiency
In our parameterization section, we provided evidence of selling frictions on the SMESM.
In the model, both the actions of buying and selling a business are dependent on the oc-
currence of a match on the SMESM. Thus, we investigate the role of the matching efficiency
on the propensity to transfer businesses between owners. Figure 8 displays the equilibrium
outcomes implied by the counterfactual experiment of increasing the matching probabilities
(hb, hs) simultaneously and in the same proportion. Furthermore, as we stressed above that
44This finding is related to Bhandari and McGrattan (2018) and a number of other papers showing the impor-
tance of intangibles when measuring contributions to aggregate output. Moreover, we solely focus on transferable
intangible assets. In practice, non-transferable intangible assets might have large additional effects on output.
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the effects of maturity were significant, we provide a decomposition by either removing all
maturity components or each one, one by one.
We find that lowering the frictions on the SMESM by increasing the matching efficiency
yields large aggregate outcomes. In our baseline with all maturity effects, increasing the
probability to sell businesses by one percentage point on the SMESM increases output in the
entrepreneurial sector by 6.9% and the wealth Gini by 0.8%. This is due to the large increase
in the number of mature businesses in the economy. Moreover, consistently with our previous
findings, most of the effect on the output of a higher matching efficiency comes from lower
failure rates and higher profit rate.45 Notice that even in the absence of mismatches between
buyers and sellers (i.e. hb = hs = 1) the fraction of buyers to entrants is capped at 80%. This
emphasizes the importance of both borrowing constraints and the fixed cost Fb in reducing
the ability to purchase businesses. Interestingly, the last panel of Figure 8 shows that wealth
concentration is sensitive to the component of the maturity and matching efficiency. We
discuss the role of maturity in shaping wealth inequality in the next section.
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6.4 Wealth Concentration and Inequality
In this section, following the important literature relating entrepreneurship and wealth con-
centration, we investigate the impact of maturity and the SMESM on wealth inequality. In
most survey data but also in general business valuation approaches, the entrepreneur is re-
45In the details, there are important general equilibrium effects. We underline them by comparing with a partial
equilibrium model in a Supplementary Appendix available upon request.
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quired to value her business assets based on their market value.46 In the model, depending
on the maturity m of a firm, we value business assets using the following approach:
Business assets(k, m) = Tangible assets(k) + Transferable intangible value(k, m)
= (1−m)[k− C(k, 0)] + mP(k) (26)
where only mature businesses possess a transferable intangible value.
Given the above, we find that the SMESM and maturity effects have remarkable conse-
quences on wealth concentration and inequality. First, in Table 9 we compare wealth (defined
as net worth) distribution statistics in the model and in the SCF data. The baseline model
with entrepreneurs matches the U.S. wealth concentration extremely well, while a compara-
ble model without entrepreneurs is unable to do so. Previous entrepreneurial models, for
instance Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), were also able to match the wealth distribution. How-
ever, the novel aspect here is that the SMESM and the maturity value of businesses enhance
wealth concentration in our model. We illustrate this by comparing our baseline to an alterna-
tive without the SMESM in case (1). Two results emerge. First, wealth concentration is more
pronounced in the baseline case because business owners transfer the value of maturity on
the SMESM. As such, the average firm size is higher and entrepreneurs are richer. This also
helps in better reproducing the wealth Gini with respect to the data. Second, the absence of a
SMESM substantially impacts the ratio of median wealth between workers and entrepreneurs
as then businesses are valued only based on their tangible assets.47
Table. 9. Wealth concentration and inequality
Ratio E/W Gini Wealth share of top
medians 1% 5% 10% 20% 40%
U.S. data a 7.0 0.810 33.6 60.3 71.4 83.4 94.6
Baseline with SMESM 6.8 0.814 35.2 62.8 73.8 83.7 93.9
Baseline without entrepreneurs - 0.522 5.1 18.2 32.1 53.2 80.1
(1) No SMESM 4.1 0.782 32.4 58.5 69.1 80.2 92.0
(2) No maturity 3.6 0.730 24.8 49.9 61.9 75.2 90.0
(3) No interest rate component 6.7 0.808 34.3 62.0 72.9 83.3 93.7
(4) No borr. cst component 6.5 0.809 34.3 62.1 73.0 83.3 93.7
(5) No profit rate component 6.0 0.785 31.1 58.3 69.5 80.4 92.4
(6) No failure rate component 5.1 0.770 30.0 55.8 67.4 79.0 91.8
a We report values for the U.S. wealth shares from Benhabib et al. (2019).
We further explore the maturity components, by applying the decompositions above to
wealth concentration and inequality. As illustrated by case (2), in the absence of any maturity
46For instance, the SCF evaluates business assets based on their market value using the following question:
"What could you sell it for?".
47Notice that inequality would still diminish if we were to assume that businesses keep the same valuation of
maturity even in the absence of a SMESM.
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effects (and thus of an operative SMESM), the ratio of median wealth between entrepreneurs
and workers decreases appreciably, translating that the share of wealth held by entrepreneurs
is significantly reduced. Wealth concentration and inequality drop by a sizable margin as
evidenced by both the share of wealth held by the top percentiles and the wealth Gini. For
instance, the wealth held by the top 1% falls from 35.2% in the baseline case to 24.8%. Com-
paring case (1) and (2), we note that removing maturity elements are enough to generate
most of the effects on wealth concentration. Interestingly, the literature has provided a num-
ber of mechanisms to match wealth concentration, from the introduction of entrepreneurs
into a worker-based economy (Quadrini (2000)), to heterogeneous patience between individ-
uals (Krusell and Smith (1998)) or the existence of voluntary bequest motives (Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006)).48 We underline a completely new channel based on the heterogeneity of
firms absent in the literature and that is furthermore consistent with the behavior of indi-
viduals in the economy and empirical evidence: maturity effects can help shape a significant
portion of wealth concentration beside their importance for the SMESM. Maturity generates
two key features: (i) more dispersed returns and income inequality between entrepreneurs
with early-stage small businesses and those running large mature ones, (ii) more income per-
sistence for entrepreneurs with mature businesses as the exit rate (the failure rate) is reduced.
Those elements, in turn, translate into more wealth inequality and wealth concentration in
the hands of very few individuals. Consequently, the effects of removing the SMESM (and
hence the possibility to transfer maturity) on inequality is larger when the accumulation of
intangible assets over time translates into more maturity, as shown by comparing our baseline
and case (1).
To close our analysis of wealth concentration and inequality, we decompose the effects of
maturity along the components mentioned above in case (3) through (6). Again the compo-
nents on profits and failure rates reported in cases (5) and (6) are the most striking, with a
significant reduction in the wealth Gini and wealth concentration at the top percentiles. This
result mirrors our previous one on aggregate outcomes: most of the maturity effects come
from those two margins.
6.5 Sensitivity Analyses
To conclude our quantitative analysis of the businesses for sale market, we perform a number
of sensitivity and robustness exercises regarding model parameters. For reasonable parameter
value changes, we find that the properties of the model remain relatively stable and that the
main results of the paper are valid. The details of these exercises are discussed in Appendix
C.
48For a more general discussion on relevant margins to generate wealth concentration consistent with social
mobility in the U.S., we refer to Benhabib et al. (2019).
36
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we build a life-cycle heterogeneous agents model with occupational choices
and introduce two key margins: prospective entrepreneurs must either buy or found their
businesses upon entering the sector while incumbents must either sell or liquidate theirs
upon exit. At the equilibrium, an endogenous business price clears a small and medium-
sized enterprises for sale market (SMESM). The option to purchase lets entrepreneurs acquire
well-established mature businesses, with a lower probability to fail, higher profits, and better
financial conditions. We argue that maturity relates to the intangible value of a firm and show
why it is a key component of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial entry and exit.
Our baseline model provides a consistent cross-sectional and aggregate representation
of the U.S. economy. We first demonstrate that the SMESM has important implications for
aggregate outcomes. By allowing the transfer of the value of the maturity of a firm between
owners, overall survival rates, firm sizes, and aggregate production are increased. Without
this market, aggregate production drops by about 10% and the consequences on aggregate
savings and prices are also severe. Second, we find that the decreasing failure rate over time
is the most important component embedded in the option value of a purchase relative to that
of a new firm creation. Third, we show that entrepreneurial life-cycle and matching frictions
are important determinants of entry and exit. While the literature has evaluated the former,
we establish that the latter can significantly shape aggregate outcomes and the composition of
the entrepreneurial pool. Finally, we uncover a novel channel to match wealth concentration
and inequality that is consistent with individual behavior and empirical evidence and is
furthermore directly linked to the SMESM and business maturity.
Our contributions might be particularly relevant for future research on the aging of en-
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In this section of the Appendix, we provide additional empirical evidence supporting the fact
that recently purchased businesses are substantially different from newly founded ones.
A.1 Acquisition type
Table 10 provides estimates of the proportion of firms by acquisition type for various U.S.
survey data. Broadly speaking, one out of five entrepreneurs enter the sector through the
purchase of an existing business. This number remains consistent across survey data and
time.
Table. 10. Business acquisition by type in U.S. surveys
Acquisition (%) Transmission (%)
Survey a Year Sample selection b Founded Purchased Inherited c Other/Gift c
SCF 2016 All entrepreneurs 74.4 18.2 3.5 3.9
ASE 2016 Only employers 68.1 20.8 4.0 7.1
SSBF 2003 All entrepreneurs 79.8 16.7 – 3.5 –
SSBF 2003 Entrepreneurs (< 5y) 77.4 20.8 – 1.8 –
SBO 2007 All entrepreneurs 74.6 18.2 2.3 4.9
SBO 2007 Entrepreneurs (≤ 3y) 74.4 19.1 1.2 5.3
a An entrepreneur is defined as an individual declaring that her business constitutes her primary source of income
(with an active management role, whenever possible). The ASE reports macro data for all business owners with
at least one paid employee.
b The estimates are based on self-employed entrepreneurs defining themselves as business owners. Early-stage
entrepreneurs are those who acquired their businesses within the last 5 years.
c When possible, we distinguish the acquisition type between gift/other and inheritance.
A.2 Business performances and owner characteristics
Table 11 shows characteristics of firms within 3 years of their acquisition and the charac-
teristics of their owners. Purchased firms systematically perform better than their founded
counterparts: the former display 4 times the average total assets and total sales with respect
to the latter and twice the average number of employees and profit. Concerning the owners of
recently purchased or founded firms, they appear very similar in terms of age, years of expe-
rience as entrepreneurs and education. To complement, in the SBO 2007, entrepreneurs were
asked Whether the owner previously owned a business or had been self-employed. 60% of founders
reported having no prior experience compared to 63% for the purchasers.
The above statistics slightly differ from those in the 2007 SCF. In that survey, for a sample
of entrepreneurs within 4 years of the acquisition of their firms, we find a mean age of about
40
44 for both founders and purchasers. The fraction of purchasers (resp. founders) with a
degree above high school is 84% (resp. 66%). Finally, the ratio of the mean net worth held by
purchasers relative to founders is about 2.8.
Table. 11. Characteristics of firms within 3 years of acquisition by type
Mean Median
Purchased Founded Ratio Purchased Founded Ratio
Firms
Total assets (USD) 766K 191K 4.0 74K 26K 2.8
Avg. number employees 9.2 4.1 2.2 5 2 2.5
Profit (USD) 118K 52K 2.3 20K 2K 10
Total sales (USD) 1093K 264K 4.1 300K 61K 4.9
Owners
Age 44.4 44.9 1.0 44 45 1.0
Years experience 10.30 10.13 1.0 6 6 1.0
≥High school deg. (%) 64 63 1.0
Source: Survey of Small Business Finances (2003)
Figure 9 complements Figure 2 in Section 2 on the failure rate of purchased versus
founded firms. The evidence reported here only concern firms with paid employees. Broadly
speaking, our results appear consistent when focusing on this group.
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Source: author’s computation using the 2007 SBO. We compute the failure rates using ceasing option linked to
either inadequate cash-flows or low sales and lack of business or personal loans/credit.
Finally, we show in Table 12 and Table 13 additional evidence on the financial constraints
faced by the group of recent purchasers and founders (within 3 years of acquisition). First,
founded firms are more likely to be denied a loan they required. Second, the main reason
why recent founded firms are denied access to credit is related their status as not in business
long enough, implying that, for creditors, the sales history is an important piece of information
influencing credit conditions.
41
Table. 12. Loan acceptance rate for firms within 4 years of acquisition by type (%)
Acquisition type Access to loan is
Always accepted Always denied Sometimes accepted or denied
Purchased 85.7 12.1 2.2
Founded 71.5 21.4 7.1
Source: Survey of Small Business Finances (2003). We use 4 years in order to increase the number of observations.
Table. 13. Main reasons why credit was denied (%)
Acquisition type Main reason for denial was
Not in business long enough Credit history Insufficient collateral Other
Purchased 0.0 26.2 24.2 49.6
Founded 34.2 19.6 7.7 38.5
Source: Survey of Small Business Finances (2003). We take 4 years in order to increase the number of observations.
A.3 Exit rate and type of exit
We display in this subsection the exit rate by exit option: business failure versus successful
sale. First, we note in Figure 10 panel (a) that sold businesses are generally older. This point is
also confirmed in Appendix A.4 using business for sale transaction data. Second, in Figure 10
panel (b), as opposed to early-stage business owners, old business owners are substantially
more likely to exit after a successful sale of their firm rather than business failure. This
additional evidence suggest that sold businesses are generally older well-established ones.
Figure 10. Type of exit and establishment data
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A.4 Small and medium-sized enterprises for sale market
In order to characterize the selling frictions, we collected transactions data from the online
platform Bizbuysell.com (hereafter BBS), one of the oldest and largest online marketplace dedi-
cated to business selling transactions in the U.S.. The available data correspond to over 90,000
observations of businesses for sale or sold. In the details, we have two sets of data: (i) a panel
of businesses for sale from 2018 to 2020 including any changes in business information; (ii)
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a collection of closed transactions from 2010 to 2020. Table 14 provide summary statistics
regarding this BBS database.
Table. 14. Descriptive statistics: BBS data on businesses for sale (2018-2020)
Statistic N Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max Mean St. Dev.
Listing price 93,270 1,100 120,000 250,000 595,000 620,000,000 713,556 4,124,977
Cash flow 57,925 0 70,000 120,812 221,000 50,000,000 200,146 405,272
Gross revenue 69,267 0 260,000 520,500 1,066,730 9,969,000 910,338 1,161,825
EBITDA 9,842 12 62,549 120,000 265,878 435,000,000 314,871 4,423,594
Nb. employees 51,855 0 2 4 9 913 8 15
Inventory 35,065 4 5,000 15,000 54,728 35,000,000 88,503 486,542
Ceasing for retirement 24,643 - - - - - 0.20 -
Figure 11 shows that only around 15% of businesses for sale are younger than 5 years.
This confirms that many businesses for sale are actually well-established mature businesses.















Source: Authors’ own computation using BBS data.
Given the remarkably low number of entrepreneurs reporting having sold their business,
especially with respect to initial intentions, important failures when trying to sell are poten-
tially occurring. The inability of SME owners to reach any business selling deal results in
liquidations: the sale at very low prices and usually restricted to tangible assets. Thus, to
investigate whether there are mismatches on the SMESM, we use the BBS data to infer the
probability of selling a business as well as the time needed to sell.49
49Concerning the comparability of the BBS dataset with respect to existing surveys, we note that 23% to 25% of
sold businesses were sold because the owner(s) retired, against 19% in the ASE (2016). About the distribution of
listing prices, the mean price is 495K USD and the median is 165K USD in BBS against respectively 682K USD and
95K USD in the PSID; meaning that the BBS price distribution is comparatively shifted to the right. However, this
comparison is indicative: there are only 357 observations concerning sold businesses in the PSID (1990 to 2015)
against 80,000 in BBS (and 93,000 businesses for sale). Moreover, many BBS listings are broker mediated and
announcers have to pay a monthly premium membership to list their entry. This might be constraining enough
for very small businesses. Overall, we believe that the BBS dataset provides a reasonable representation of U.S.
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Figure 12. Probability to sell with listing price as a proxy for size.






















To be read as follows: after a year, 32% of all businesses have been sold. The price corresponds to
that at the initial listing date. Source: Authors’ own computation using collected BBS data.
Using the same strategy as in the core of the paper, Figure 12 displays the probability to
sell a business after a number of months from the listing date and by listing price brackets.
After a full year, only around 25%-35% of businesses for sale are actually sold. While this
number is fairly similar for any business size (as proxied by the listing price), it seems to be
slightly easier to sell a smaller business.
B Model: further details
B.1 Numerical solution method: discrete-continuous model with the endogenous
grid method (DC-EGM) under taste shocks
To tackle the issue of the high dimensionality of our problem, we adapt the recently devel-
oped DC-EGM solution method introduced in Iskhakov et al. (2017): it solves the occupa-
tional choice problem while still accommodating the fast endogenous grid method developed
in Carroll (2006). On top of a substantially increased computation speed, this method is also
well-adapted to the context of occupational choices. As shown in Hurst and Pugsley (2011),
the decision to enter entrepreneurship is also driven by non-pecuniary benefits that are, to
some extent, not observable by the econometrician. In the model, we, therefore, introduce
taste shocks to both smooth the value functions when applying the DC-EGM algorithm, as
well as to get closed-form expressions for the probability to switch from one occupation to
another through the available options of continuing, selling, purchasing, founding or liqui-
dating a business.
Our algorithm has been implemented in C/C++. The details of the computation are
business transactions.
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provided in the Online Appendix.
B.2 Calibration details
Earning process We take the life-cycle average earning profile in Guvenen et al. (2015). We
fit a life-cycle earning profile with a third order polynomial. Table 15 provides the corre-
sponding values.
Table. 15. Life cycle earning profile
[25 : 30[ [30 : 35[ [35 : 40[ [40 : 45[ [45 : 50[ [50 : 55[ [55 : 60[ [60 : 65[ 65 and over
h(1) h(2) h(3) h(4) h(5) h(6) h(7) h(8) h(9)
0.58 0.72 0.84 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.90 0.75 0.40
C Sensitivity Analyses
The baseline model embeds a number of features that let us match empirical elements. In this
section, we investigate the importance of key features interacting with the option values of
selling and purchasing a business that might have an impact on aggregate outcomes. In the
following, prices clear the markets and taxes are adjusted to balance the government budget
constraint. Results are displayed in Table 16.
Table. 16. Sensitivity analyses on the SME market and aggregate outcomes.
E
W






p rs τw% % % size
U.S. data a 11.0% 21.0 7-14 67 – – 0.40 3.2 – 4-6% –
Baseline model 11.3% 24.0 10.0 66 45 2.4 0.45 3.2 0.17 4.9% 15.0%
Adj. cost, φup = 0.1∆k 11.0% 18.9 9.8 63 22 1.8 0.33 2.8 0.41 6.4% 16.9%
Doubling uR cost 10.0% 26.3 12.3 65 38 2.1 0.39 3.2 0.16 5.1% 16.3%
No fixed cost Fb = 0 11.7% 51.0 13.1 79 48 2.5 0.47 3.3 0.27 4.8% 14.7%











11.1% 22.0 9.8 65 32 2.1 0.39 3.1 0.20 5.4% 15.9%
No sales tax τs = 0 11.2% 24.1 10.0 66 45 2.4 0.45 3.2 0.17 4.9% 15.2%
a We report value for the U.S. economy using Penn World Table 9.1, treasury bond interest rate, Current Pop-
ulation Survey (1998:2008), Survey of Consumer Finance (2001:2007) and the 2007 Survey of Business Owners.
We first investigate the role of adjustment costs. In the baseline model, we normalized
the upsizing cost φup to zero. Thus the main source of capital illiquidity came from the
downsizing cost of liquidating business assets. We test the sensitivity of increasing φup to
10%. That is, for each unit of capital k bought, the cost is (1+ 0.1)k. The resulting equilibrium
implies a lower average business size. With the increase in the relative cost of founding a new
business relative to purchasing an existing one, business price level increases and the fraction
of buyers able to purchase business drops. Due to fewer business transfers and a lower level
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of accumulated business capital, aggregate output drops. In the end, it comes as no surprise
to us that adjustment costs have important equilibrium effects, but the main mechanisms of
the model remain similar.
As we argued in Section 2, the entrepreneurial life-cycle matters since an important frac-
tion of entrepreneurs sell their business assets upon retirement. In the model, we capture this
behavior by having a disutility cost uR of working in the retirement age bracket. Doubling
this utility cost reduces the fraction of entrepreneurs in the last age bracket from 4.8% to 1.4%,
and the fraction of entrepreneurs from 11.5% to 10.0%. The fraction of sellers substantially
increases, since many old entrepreneurs are now trying to sell, lowering the business price
and therefore increasing the fraction of buyers in the economy. Because older entrepreneurs
want to exit earlier, they accumulate fewer capital assets, and the average firm size and pro-
duction fall. We argue that the aging of entrepreneurs, accelerating since the 2010s, might be
a first-order concern on the SMESM.
Buying a business incurs the payment of a fixed cost Fb. Our third sensitivity test sets
Fb to zero. We find that the share of entrepreneurs increases by 0.3 percentage points and
that the share of buyers rises from 21% to 51%. As purchasing a business is now less costly
with respect to founding, the share of mature businesses increases significantly. Business
price level increases since now a larger fraction of entrepreneurs are able to buy an existing
business. Overall, this leads to a substantial increase in aggregate output.
Next, we benchmark the effect of the profit margin by doubling the profit component
between immature and mature firms (we let γ(0) = 0.9γbenchmark(0) and we keep γ(1) =
1.1γbenchmark(0) such that the difference in terms of profit rate is about 20%). This leads to an
increase in the propensity of new entrant to buy an existing business. As mature firms are
now more valuable, more of them are bought and their proportion in the economy increases,
leading to an increase in business price. However, due to the lower profit rate of early-stage
businesses, aggregate output decreases..
Finally, additional sensitive tests include lowering the tightness of the borrowing con-
straint and setting the sales tax τs to zero. Those two margins are shown to have only marginal
effects.
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